In the decade since Russia’s invasion of Crimea — and certainly in the years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — it’s been easy to see the antagonistic relationship between Russia and NATO as a historical inevitability. Further, as a product of Vladimir Putin’s repeated aggression towards other former Soviet states and, in Russia’s view, a perceived series of betrayals or backhanded policies at the hands of NATO. For the first few years of the post-Cold War era, however, many believed this sort of situation to be far from inevitable.
One of the diplomats who attempted to prevent the current scenario during these critical years was a man by the name of Strobe Talbott, who served as deputy secretary of state under President Bill Clinton from 1994 until the end of Clinton’s presidency in 2001. Recently, Talbott’s legacy has come to further attention following the publication of a book by German international relations scholar Stephan Kieninger, titled “Securing Peace in Europe: Strobe Talbott, NATO, and Russia After the Cold War.”
On Monday, Kieninger joined a panel of experts at UVA’s Miller Center to discuss his book and the history of NATO in the 1990s more generally. The other members of the panel were Victoria Nuland, who served as undersecretary of state for political affairs during Joe Biden’s administration; Stephen Sestanovich, former US Ambassador-at-large to the former Soviet Union during Bill Clinton’s second term; and Eric Edelman, a former US ambassador to Finland and Turkey, who also moderated the panel. The panelists were introduced by William Antholis, Director of the Miller Center.
Antholis began by noting how the Russian Invasion of Ukraine has recently made the history of NATO more relevant to the general public, and provided a brief summary of Kieninger’s book and what the panel would discuss. He then handed the panel over to Edelman, who invited the panelists to give their personal assessments of Tablott. There was a general consensus that Talbott was an uncommonly hard and talented worker during his time in the State Department. Edelman noted his willingness to push the envelope when he disagreed with existing policy, Kieninger noted his detailed notes and ability to wake every day at 4:00 in the morning to get to work, and Nuland noted his ability to go up the chain of command and directly speak to President Clinton, sometimes to the chagrin of other superiors.
Edelman then asked Sestanovich specifically to discuss the debates in the mid-1990s over the enlargement of NATO, and Sestanovich’s skepticism at the time towards such policies. Sestanovich gave some background information, discussing how Talbott was sometimes perceived as being too friendly towards the Russians, and also noting how Talbott had helped bring him into the administration to include a voice that was less enthusiastic about NATO expansion. As for the specific matter of NATO enlargement, Sestanovich noted that the administration knew that Russia would not be pleased with any decisions to enlarge NATO, but explained that the goal of diplomacy ought not to be to please other countries in every situation, but to use one’s power as a diplomat to achieve the goals of one’s own country to the greatest extent.
The conversation subsequently dealt with two major topics: the Budapest Accord, a 1994 agreement in which Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons, and Talbott’s involvement in negotiations over the Yugoslav Wars. With regards to the former topic, all three panelists agreed that instability in Ukraine and the immense costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal made the feasibility of Ukraine actually holding onto the weapons dubious at best, though Sestanovich noted that many Ukrainians today, logically or not, regret making the decision. As for the Yugoslav Wars, Sestanovich noted that such conflicts demonstrated that the 1990s were nowhere near the time of peace they are sometimes perceived as, and explained that while there were worries of a US-Russia split at the time, tensions between the two countries during the Yugoslav Wars were not necessarily a breaking point. Nuland noted Russia’s subsequent perception of the conflicts as a betrayal by NATO, but also emphasized Talbott’s role in attempting to create a mutually beneficial settlement, despite bad-faith behavior from Russia.
The panelists concluded by discussing why NATO ultimately failed to contain Russian aggression. Sestanovich argued that NATO focused excessively on curbing neo-imperialism from Russia, and not enough on countering Putin’s authoritarian tendencies. Nuland made a similar argument, stating that the United States was mistaken in simply allowing Putin to consolidate power at home while attempting to contain him abroad. Kieninger tied the conversation back to Talbott, who, he noted, was aware of Putin’s personality and authoritarian tendencies long before many global leaders came to the same conclusions. Whether there now exists a diplomat as talented as Talbott who may be able to solve the crises resulting from tensions between Russia and NATO, however, remains to be seen.
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